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Abstract— We analyze the relationship between product 
quality and governance mode choice using the results of a 
survey of DOC Rioja wineries. Wineries that produce high-
quality wines are more likely to vertically integrate than are 
wineries that produce low-quality wines. Consistent with 
Transaction Cost Economics, we find evidence that asset 
specificity and uncertainty are important determinants of 
vertical integration. Finally, the size of the winery is also an 
important factor that affects governance mode choice in 
viticulture.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Food quality is an increasingly important issue in the 
agricultural sector. Indeed, the competitiveness of food 
companies in national and international markets depends 
upon their ability to adopt production processes which meet 
quality requirements [1].  
To date, research about vertical relationships in 
agriculture has come to be dominated by the principal-agent 
framework. In this approach, protecting input quality has 
been suggested to be a possible motivation for the use of 
contracts over the spot market alternative, especially in the 
presence of imperfect quality measurement [2]. A majority 
of this literature relies on theoretical models and simulation 
exercises. While these contributions have enhanced our 
understanding of vertical relationships, supporting evidence 
has been weak [3].  
On the contrary, many empirical studies have found 
support for the transaction cost theory’s main hypotheses. 
That is, asset specificity and uncertainty are the main 
determinants of the integration choice. But although it has 
been recognized that the concept of food quality is closely 
related to the notion of transaction cost, less attention has 
been paid to this fact. Among the few existing studies, [4] 
investigates the relationships between quality and the 
marketing channels used for Polish hog transactions.  
Taking into account that the increasing demand for food 
quality accentuates the degree of interdependence among 
different levels of the supply chain, it is an important 
omission from most of the previous empirical literature not 
to analyse quality issues as a possible determinant of 
vertical relationships.   
We analyze Qualified Appellation of Origin (DOCa) 
Rioja wine market, an industry with a wide variety of 
vertical relationships and a considerable variation among 
types of wines. Industry participants implicitly associate 
having own vineyard with protecting grape quality. Using 
data from a survey of DOCa Rioja winegrape processors, 
we identify how wine quality interacts with the choice of 
governance mechanism. Like [5] and [6], we seek to 
enhance understanding of the determinants of vertical 
coordination by studying an industry where quality is an 
important consideration. Unlike these studies, examines the 
choice not only of spot market and contracts, but of vertical 
integration as well. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. 
The following section provides the theoretical background 
and hypothesis for governance mode choices. In section 3 
the measures and data collection procedures are described. 
An empirical section follows that describe the findings of 
several models and how these relate to the hypotheses. A 
final section presents a discussion of the implications of the 
study and suggestions for future research.  
 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Williamson [7] maintains that transaction costs are not directly 
measurable since they represent the potential consequences of 
alternative decisions. Hence, Williamson [7] builds the TCE 
framework on a set of dimensions that are proposed to determine 
the transaction costs incurred under different organizational forms. 
Analysis of the discrete governance structures 
Williamson [8] distinguishes three generic forms of economic 
organization, market, hybrid and hierarchy, by different 
instruments as Table 1 shows. The hybrid mode includes 
intermediate forms such as various types of long term contracts, 
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Table 1: Distinguishing attributes of Market, Hybrid, and Hierarchy 
governance structures* 
 Governance  structure 
Attributes    Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Incentive intensity  ++  +  0 
Administrative controls  0  +  ++ 
Autonomous adaptation capacity  ++  +  0 
Coordinated adaptation capacity  0  +  ++ 
Contract law  ++  +  0 
* ++= strong; +=semi-strong; 0=weak       
Source: Adapted from Williamson [8] 
 
Determinants of governance mechanisms 
The factors determining the governance mode choice are 
grouped into four broad categories: (1) the specificity of the assets 
required to produce the good, (2) the uncertainty surrounding the 
transaction, (3) the size of the winery and (4) the product quality.   
Asset specificity  
Williamson [9] emphasized asset specificity as the critical 
factor in determining choice of governance structure. Asset 
specificity can take several forms: physical asset specificity, 
human asset specificity, site specificity, dedicated assets, temporal 
specificity and brand name capital. For the purposes of this study, 
we focus on physical asset specificity and dedicated assets.   
Physical asset specificity describes the situation where assets 
are tailored to a specific relationship and are difficult to re-deploy 
for other purposes without the sacrifice of productive value. 
Accordingly, the TCE hypothesis that has been repeatedly in the 
literature, and that we test as well, is that when the value of 
physical specific assets increases, vertical integration is more 
likely to be used.   
Dedicated asset specificity refers to grapes which were 
cultivated for the purpose of one particular vintner. Since 
winegrapes are extremely perishable, the vintner could seek to 
appropriate rents by taking advantage of the grower´s need to 
harvest and sell his grapes in a relatively short period of time [6].  
Similarly to the previous specificity, it is expected that when the 
value of dedicated asset specificity increases, vertical integration is 
more likely to be used.  
Uncertainty  
A second transaction dimension is uncertainty, which affects 
the ability of parties in a transaction to specify fully the range of 
future contingencies [9].  
A basic assumption of Transaction Cost Theory is that all 
transactions are conducted under a certain level of imperfect 
information, which takes different forms- behavioral and 
environmental- that can impact exchanges.  
Behavioral uncertainty is linked to measurement. Contracting 
parties should be able to evaluate the elements exchanged, in 
quantity and quality. If performance cannot be easily assessed, the 
market will fail because it is known what to reward and how [10]. 
Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that increased behavioral 
uncertainty will lead to increased use of vertical integration.  
When the circumstances surrounding the exchange cannot be 
specified in advance, environmental uncertainty appears. 
Nevertheless, Williamson argues that unpredictability per se does 
not favour vertical integration, only in interaction with asset 
specificity. This argument suggests that when environmental 
uncertainty increases, in the presence of asset specificity, vertical 
integration is more likely to be used. 
Frequency is another important factor mentioned by 
Williamson [7]. It refers to the regularity of the transaction. For the 
purposes of this particular study, however, we do not measure the 
effects of the frequency because all transactions that were 
examined occurred with the same frequency.   
Winery Size  
Williamson [11] points to diseconomies of scale as a factor 
limiting the extent of vertical integration. This is because 
internalization comes at the cost of additional bureaucracy and 
lower-powered incentives [9]. All of this suggests that big-size 
wineries are less likely to vertically integrate than small-size 
wineries.  
Product quality 
Another factor that may affect the governance mechanism 
choice is whether the differentiation is an important feature of the 
delivered product. Agricultural products in general, and viticulture 
in particular, are extremely sensitive to the differentiation effects. 
In the wine grape supply industry, differentiation is a critical issue, 
and one that is important in distinguishing competitors. If a winery 
has a reputation for highly differentiated wines, given the 
relatively low price sensitivity of consumers, that winery will have 
a distinct competitive advantage over other wineries that do not 
have the same reputation. When the importance of differentiation 
is combined with measurement problems, the contracting poses 
special hazards, consistent with the standard moral hazard 
problem. In this sense, wineries producing highly differentiated 
wines are exposed to serious risks of loss and damage if the quality 
of the grapes they use isn’t as it is expected. Consequently, such 
wineries will seek the maximum control of the process to 
minimize the chances of reputation losses. Since the third party use 
is associated with loss of control, we hypothesize that wineries 
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Table 2: Summary of hypotheses  
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The above hypotheses were tested on survey data from the 
wine industry with an illustration of a specific case in Spain, the 
Qualified Appellation of Origin “DOCa Rioja”. We selected one 
industry, rather than several, to detect real differences in 
practice that might otherwise be confounded with industry-
specific effects. This limits the generalizability of results, but 
does allow us establish internal validity (Anderson, 1985). 
The population from which the sample is drawn consists of 
wineries who fulfil the following requisites1: (1) to belong to 
the Designation of Origin Rioja  (2) to be wine-making 
processors (3) to have the obligation to present accounting 
information in the public registry and (4) not to be cooperatives.  
The survey was returned by 187 participants2, the 88,2 per 
cent of the population. In order to limit the influence of external 
shocks, the study period refers to the past 3-year period.  A 
comparison of responding wineries with the population of all 
general wineries using the chi-square test (p=0,094) showed no 
statistically significant differences between the sample and the 
population in regard to size using the European Commission´s 
classification of Small and Medium-Sized Firms. The largest 
number (68%) of wineries in the sample had less than 10 
                                                           
1. 
1 The population was drawn from the 2007 list provided by the 
Control Board of the Designation of Origen Rioja.  
2. 
2 All the questionnaire returned were usable responses because we 
followed up missing questionnaires.  
employees while 27% had between 10 and 49 employees and 
5% had more than 50 employees.  
Variable operationalization 
The constructs were operationalized with a mix of original 
and adapted scales relied on previous survey-based transaction 
cost studies.  
Dependent variable:  Governance mode choice 
We build the dependent variable (GOV MECH) according to 
Williamson´s classification where we have distinguished three 
generic types of governance structures: market, hybrid and 
hierarchy. The survey asked the respondent to indicate the 
percentage of each type of governance mechanism they used to 
provide their grape needs. The database contains a variable 
named “Mechanisms of Governance” upon which we build the 
dependent variable as follows: 
GOV_MECH=0 or “Market mode” if a winery buys at least 
80 percent of its grape needs through the market mechanism 
GOV_MECH=2 or “Hierarchical mode”  if a winery has 
integrated vertically at least 80 percent of its grape needs 
GOV_MECH=1 or “Hybrid mode” if the remaining firms 
that haven’t been classified previously. In this category are 
included either wineries that establish a contract for at least 80 
percent of its grape needs or wineries that combine different 
mechanisms governance without rising the 80 percent in one of 
them.  
In short, the higher value of the dependent variable, the more 
the governance mechanism is located to the hierarchy pole.   
There is little consensus in the literature with regard to the 
value of percent cutoff that should be established. Given this 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008   4 
absence of a general rule, we decided to establish the cutoff by 
inspecting the distribution of the dependent variable for natural 
breaks. In particular, this cutoff yielded 32 wineries in market 
mode (17 percent), 73 wineries in hybrid mode (39 percent), and 
82 wineries (44 percent). To establish the robustness of the 
results, we also obtained a simulation exercise with the cutoff 
changed to 70% and to 90%.  
Independent variables 
We use items on seven-point scales anchored by “strongly 
disagree” and “strongly agree” to measure both transaction cost 
dimensions, specificity and uncertainty.  
Physical asset specificity (PAS): This variable shows the 
degree to which the investments in the relationship are not 
redeployable to other relationships. A mathematical average of 
two items were used to measure this variable 
(correlation=0.246, p<0.001). One item asked about the 
investments by the grape grower, and the second dealt with the 
winery investment.      
Dedicated asset specificity (DAS): Measured as the excess of 
capacity that a grower has to support if the grapes which were 
cultivated for the purpose of one particular winery are rejected 
by it. 
Behavioral uncertainty (BU): This variable shows the degree 
to which it is difficult for the winery to know the real effort 
made by the grower in the grape production process in absence 
of monitoring. 
Environmental uncertainty (EU): The scaling of this concept 
is based on the mathematical average of two items that indicate 
respondents´ perception on the uncertainty existing in grape 
yield and quality, respectively (correlation=0.677, p<0.001).   
As we mentioned earlier, the effect of environmental 
uncertainty on governance mode choice is conditioned by the 
presence or not of specificity. Following to Coles and Hesterly 
(1998a), this condition was operationalized by means of an 
interaction between a dummy variable (λ) and environmental 
uncertainty. This dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the value 
of the overall level of specificity3 is above 1, and 0 for values 
of 1. 
Size (SIZE): We used the logarithm of average capacity over 
the period 2002-2004 as a proxy of size because variables based 
on assets are directly dependent upon the decision to integrate 
production activities (Leiblein and Miller, 2003). With regards 
to the variable based on sales we don’t use it because managers 
are reluctant to give this type of information.    
Product quality: In order to examine the impact of vertical 
differentiation on the integration decision we adapt the measure 
of quality utilised by Coles and Hesterly (1998b). We divide 
Rioja wines into three categories according to the classification 
provided by the Board: Joven, Crianza and Reserva4. As there 
are three groups, we code them with two dummy variables. On 
the one hand, low added value (AVLOW), coded 1 if a winery 
produces at least 50 percent of the first group and zero 
otherwise. On the other hand, high added value, (AVHIGH), 
                                                           
3 The overall level of specificity is the mathematical average of physical 
asset specificity (EAF) and dedicated asset specificity (EAD) 
(correlation=0.268, p<0.001). 
4 Gran Reserva is included in this category.   
coded 1 if a winery produces at least 50 percent of the third 
group and zero otherwise. 
 
3.    MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
To test the hypotheses, we analysed the distribution of the 
dependent variable, the governance mechanism choice, resulting 
in a discrete variable with three outcomes: market, hybrid and 
hierarchy mode. Consistent with transaction cost theory, these 
outcomes are ranked by vertical coordination. When the 
dependent variable is inherently ordered, the most appropriate 
method for estimating this model is an ordered logit. However, 
the results of the Brant test indicate to us that the ordered logit 
model is not appropriate because the parallel regression 
assumption of the ordered logit is violated by many variables 
(see table 3).   
Then, we search for more flexible parametric models for 
ordered dependent variables, in which the multinomial logit 
model stands at one extreme in terms of high flexibility. The 
multinomial logit model builds in the assumption that the choice 
between any pair of alternatives is independent of the 
availability of other alternatives.  We verify it with the Hausman 
test and Suest- based Hausman test, which don´t confirm the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption in all 
categories (see table 4). Hence, this model is not appropriate 
either. 
Finally, we estimate a generalized ordered logit, which is less 
restrictive than an ordered logit and more parsimonious than a 
multinomial logit [16].  
The marginal effects of the generalized ordered logit used to 
test the hypotheses are presented in table 5. As we mentioned 
earlier, we estimated for maximum likelihood a model for each 
cutoff (90, 80 and 70) of the dependent variable.  Given that the 
statistical significance of coefficients is quite similar  
in all cut-offs, evidence of robustness of the results is obtained. 
Looking at the results, we see that as physical asset 
specificity increase, the probability of choosing vertical 
integration increases, while the probability of the hybrid mode 
decreases as does the probability of the market mode. With 
respect to temporal specificity, its effects are the same in 
direction and significance than physical asset specificity.  
Turning to the behavioural uncertainty, increases in this 
variable result in more vertical integration and less hybrid mode. 
With regards the market mode, this variable has not a significant 
influence on it. The interaction effect between specificity and 
environmental uncertainty (λEU) displays similar patters of 
results for hierarchical and hybrid modes. However, it has a 
negative and significant effect on market mode.  
With respect to size, increases in this variable do not affect 
the market mode, but they result in more hybrid mode and less 
vertical integration. This result is intuitive. The greater the 
winery is, the greater the grape needs it has. If the winery has a 
large size and it wants to integrate their production of grape, it is 
impossible to plant all their vineyards next to it. In this case, 
vertical integration can be inefficient due to high time and 
transport costs to control the vineyard.     
As we expected, for discrete change of high quality from 0 to 
1 the probability of choosing hierarchical mode increases. 
Conversely, the probability of choosing hybrid and market 
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mode decreases. Likewise, marginal effects of low quality have 




Table 3. Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption 
Variable  χ2 p>  χ2  χ2 p>  χ2  χ2 p>  χ2 
All 27.80  0.000 38.47 0.000 20.91 0.004 
  Physical asset specificity (PAS)   4.9  0.027   1.92  0.166   0.32  0.569 
  Dedicated asset specificity (DAS)    0.00  0.971 0.24 0.627   0.54 0.463 
  Behavioral uncertainty (BU)  12.49  0.000   16.52  0.000   5.43 0.020 
  Environmental Uncertainty (λEU)    0.31  0.579 0.01 0.909   0.03 0.858 
  Size (SIZE)  11.60  0.001   18.17  0.000    13.06  0.000 
  Low Added Value (AVLOW)  0.97  0.326     2.19  0.139  0.48  0.487 
  High Added Value (AVHIGH)  1.53  0.217     2.54  0.111  1.10  0.293 
 
 
Table 4: IIA tests: Hausman test (*) and Suest-based Hausman test (**) 
Drop  Y=ORD90 Y=ORD80 Y=ORD70 
Y=2 p>  χ2 0.999 (*) 
p> χ2 0.000 (**) 
It fails IIA test 
p> χ2 0.000 (**) 
It fails IIA test 
Y=1 
p> χ2 0.000 (*) 
It fails IIA test 
p> χ2 0.839 (*) 
 
p> χ2 0.006 (**) 
It fails IIA test 
Y=0 p>  χ2 0.985 (*) 
p> χ2 0.08 (**) 
It fails IIA test 
p> χ2 0.986 (*) 
 
 
Table 5: Marginal effects for generalized ordered logit models 
  Vertical Integration  Hybrid  Market 
Parameter  90 80 70 90  80  70  90  80  70 
PAS (H1)    0.101**     0.127**   0.110**  -0.066**  -0.088**  -0.059**  -0.036**  -0.039**   -0.051** 
DAS (H2)    0.066**    0.071**   0.072**  -0.043**  -0.049**  -0.039**  -0.023**  -0.022**   -0.033** 
BU (H3)    0.050*    0.072**   0.088**  -0.065**  -0.084**  -0.082**   0.015   0.012   -0.006 
λEU (H4)    0.063**    0.115**   0.124**  -0.041*  -0.080**  -0.067**  -0.022**  -0.036**   -0.057** 
SIZE (H5)  - -0.159**  -0.190**  -0.170**   0.154**   0.188**  0.153**   0.005   0.001     0.017 
AVLOW  (H6)  - -0.049  -0.084  -0.130   0.031   0.057   0.067   0.018   0.027   0.064 
AVHIGH  (H7)    0.368**    0.475**   0.326**  -0.294*  -0.383**  -0.210*  -0.073**  -0.091**  -0.116** 
Chi-square statistic    0.000      0.000      0.000   
McFadden´s Adj R
2      0.327      0.363      0.324   
Predicted capacity                      71.66%      71.12%      70.59%   
     * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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III. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
There is no doubt that food and agribusiness firms have 
increasingly to deal with competitive markets in which food 
safety has become a decisive aspect for competitiveness.  
We have established the nature of the relationship between 
product quality and vertical coordination in DOCa Rioja 
winegrape industry. Our analysis of the choice among market, 
hybrid and vertical integration suggests that more vertical 
coordination is associated with higher product quality.  
Further, consistent with transaction cost economics, we find 
that vertical integration can be an efficient means of protecting 
relationship-specific investments or mitigating other potential 
conflicts under incomplete contracting in viticulture. In 
particular, we find evidence that asset specificity and 
uncertainty are important determinants of vertical integration. 
Likewise, our results reinforce the importance of the interaction 
effect between specificity and environmental uncertainty on 
vertical integration. As predicted by our model, the size of the 
winery is a factor that should be taken in account in our area of 
study.  
We are conscious that there are a number of important 
limitations to this particular study that suggest the need for 
further empirical work. The fit of the model, though good for 
basic research, may be improved not only be developing better 
measures (e.g., using multi-item measures), but also by 
including variables no covered here, such as the existing 
regulation. 
In spite of these limitations, this paper may have interesting 
managerial implications which are worth mentioning here. 
Given that our analysis characterizes the quality-coordination 
relationship and the determinants of governance mode choice, 
we believe that our findings will be of interest to those 
industries with a variety of governance modes, and with a 
significant concern for quality.    
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